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Abstract: Tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture is a key challenge for governments seeking to 
implement the European Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD). In the research literature, 
how best to integrate and align effective measures for tackling diffuse pollution, within the context 
of the EU’s multilevel governance structure, remains an open question. This paper focuses on the 
first and second implementation cycles of the WFD to explore how national governance 
arrangements either facilitated or hindered the adoption of effective policies, especially with regards 
to the delivery of agricultural and water policies on the ground. It draws on data collected through 
systematic document analysis and interviews with key experts, policymakers and interest groups, 
and presents a comparative analysis of two case studies: England and Scotland. The case studies 
show that Scotland’s joined-up governance structure, which enabled policymakers and interest 
groups to work together and to build trust and cooperation, facilitated the adoption of stricter 
measures for tackling diffuse pollution. In contrast, in England institutional fragmentation 
prevented a meaningful engagement of all parties and acted as a barrier. The analysis unpacks the 
design of policy mixes and the conditions that allow national governments to pursue more holistic 
and integrated governance approaches to overcome opposition from interest groups and gain their 
support. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite ambitious targets set in the EU by the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC, 
henceforth WFD), to date few water bodies have achieved good water quality status [1]. The WFD 
aims to reshape water management in Europe through the lens of sustainable development, meaning 
that it jointly considers human health, economic activities and ecosystems, and thus moves away 
from previous piecemeal European water legislation [2,3]. To achieve this goal, the WFD, which came 
into force in 2000, stipulated the aims that all EU water bodies should achieve good ecological and 
chemical status by 2015, and that there should be no deterioration of water bodies [4]. It also set longer 
term deadlines (2021 and 2027) through two further implementation cycles as well as mechanisms to 
account for derogations and exemptions. However, EU countries have thus far failed to seize the 
opportunity offered by the Directive to recast traditional water management in favour of more 
sustainable models, and preferred business-as-usual approaches [5]. All sources of non-point and 
widespread pollution are complex problems and constitute a major challenge for environmental 
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regulators and policymakers; issues of diffuse pollution tend to be more costly to address and require 
a multitude of regulatory approaches, as well as a degree of behavioural change among a high 
number of policymakers and interest groups [6]. This paper draws on data from 25 in-depth 
interviews and detailed documentary analysis to advance our understanding of this challenge in the 
context of the WFD by providing an analysis of WFD implementation outcomes through a novel lens 
of institutional and governance arrangements. It does so through a comparative analysis of two 
cases—Scotland and England—to offer a situated explanation of the extent to which governance 
arrangements facilitated or obstructed the adoption of more ambitious policy instruments. Despite 
manifest differences in physical geography characteristics, pressures, and demographics, from this 
comparative analysis it is possible to draw lessons that are applicable elsewhere and that could 
inform the next cycle of the Directive. 
Previous EU water legislation was characterised by piecemeal approaches, which ”reduced 
environmental systems into parameters without adequate assessment of the actual environmental 
state”, and were, for this reason, not considered adequate to tackling water pollution ([7], p. 281). The 
WFD and its ambitious environmental goals created the expectation among scholars and 
practitioners that the future of water policy in Europe would see a paradigm shift towards more 
holistic and integrated practice [5,8]. However, at the end of the first implementation cycle (2009–
2015) the assessment conducted by the European Commission (EC) of the River Basin Management 
Plans (RBMPs) revealed that all governments across Europe were struggling to achieve good 
ecological and chemical status [9]. With only 43% of water bodies on track to reach good status, the 
EC has been concerned about the manifest inadequacy of the measures adopted by Member States to 
tackle diffuse pollution from agriculture. Their disappointing performance was not limited to the first 
implementation cycle, but has persisted, at the time of writing, through the course of the second cycle 
(2021). The most recent report published by the European Environment Agency [10] confirmed that 
still less than 50% of water bodies are in good ecological status and that agricultural diffuse pollution 
(e.g., from nitrates and pesticides) remains the main pressure. 
Our study brings together the EU public policy implementation literature and the literature on 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and provides an insight into the link between 
governance structures, decision-making processes and the ambition of environmental policy outputs. 
This paper focuses on the governance structures put in place by EU Member States (MSs) to show 
how these were more or less conducive to effective policies to reduce diffuse pollution from nutrients 
and pesticides, an issue that remains understudied [11]. We use the terms governance structures and 
arrangements interchangeably to refer to the creation of institutions and the allocation of 
responsibilities and resources to specific policy actors with decision-making powers linked to specific 
goals [12]. In the context of EU environmental policies, national governance arrangements involve 
the interaction of policymakers and policy actors at different institutional levels [13–15]. 
Crucially, in this regard, while MSs are free to choose their institutional approach and 
interventions, the WFD text incorporated the key principle of integrated water resource management 
(IWRM), which promotes a more effective approach to tackling diffuse pollution as one of the main 
pressures on water quality [16–18]. This paper analyses the governance arrangements for 
implementing the WFD and how these forms were tied to more holistic and integrated water 
management approaches and environmental outcomes [19,20]. We conclude that the adoption of 
stricter regulatory measures and general binding rules in Scotland was rooted in clearly structured 
and innovative governance arrangements that allowed for intensive cooperation and joint decision 
making among key policy actors [21]. By contrast, England did not modify its existing water 
governance arrangements to implement the WFD [22]. In this case, a lack of shared responsibilities, 
together with less effective stakeholder engagement practices, resulted in a political preference for 
voluntary approaches. These were never going to capable of delivering significant improvements in 
water quality. Compared to England, the Scottish case stands out for the direct involvement 
throughout the process of the Scottish Government, which mandated a change in water governance 
structures. The new structures were required to facilitate effective cooperation, including on the part 
of the farming community and were explicitly aimed at tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture. 
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The paper builds on traditional public policy and institutional analysis research that emphasises 
the role of institutions in shaping the policy process, which in turn leads to the adoption of a certain 
policy mix [23–27]. It is difficult to establish a definite link between the implementation of certain 
policies and the environmental outcomes that we observe on the ground due to a multitude of 
variables that can intervene throughout the policy process and affect it [28,29]. Due to these 
complexities, as Cairney et al. observe, ‘studies of EU policymaking tend to focus on the large gap 
between intention and action’ ([29], p. 15). Moreover, as pointed out in the editorial of this Special 
Issue, stricter policy instruments are more conducive to better environmental outcomes [30] and, 
therefore, the adoption of a mix of different types of interventions increases the likelihood of 
achieving policy goals. Consequently, by understanding the pathways that lead policymakers to 
choose a certain policy mix, we can advance our understanding of the barriers to successful policy 
implementation as well as the links between the EU policy implementation theory and IWRM [11]. 
2. Analysing the WFD Implementation 
The WFD implementation process has attracted scholars’ attention since its early stages [31–34]. 
The issue was studied from the perspective of various disciplinary fields [35,36] and with studies 
overwhelmingly focusing on assessing specific aspects of the directive, such as public participation 
processes in river basin management [37–44]. 
Among studies of the WFD implementation gap, one common approach is to point towards 
flaws in the formulation of the WFD text itself [45,46]. Technical criticisms of its very ambitious goals, 
and of a putative mismatch between the WFD’s demands and the feasibility of a response on the 
required timescale, suggest the WFD’s environmental targets could never have been realistically 
achieved within the timeframe [47,48]. Other authors have criticised technical aspects of the WFD 
and in particular the one out-all out principle, which means that water bodies are classified based on 
the worst status among the elements assessed, thus potentially leading to “pessimism bias” with 
regards to the overall ecological status of water bodies [49,50]. The text of the WFD, which has been 
defined as a political compromise [51], has also come in for criticism for the legal weakness of its 
environmental goals, which are not strictly binding and allow governments to invoke exemptions, 
thereby permitting them to aim at lower targets in the implementation phase [45]. 
Fully resolving the open academic debates on these various issues is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Our starting point is instead the fact that, contrary to the original spirit of the WFD, member-
states have failed to take advantage of the opportunity to change water policies and did not 
implement a mix of policies embodying a holistic and integrated water management approach [2,5,7]. 
In particular, through the comparative analysis of two contrasting case studies, this paper looks at 
the pathways that lead policymakers to choose a more or less ambitious policy mix. In this regard, it 
is useful to remember that the WFD is not prescriptive in terms of governance approaches or with 
regards to individual policy instruments [52]. This means that it allows MSs freedom of choice within 
its framework, and indeed there is evidence of variations in the chosen approaches [53–56]. 
We acknowledge that there can be intervening factors that can affect policy implementation and 
therefore their environmental outcomes [29]. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the editorial of this 
Special Issue, stricter policy instruments are more conducive to better environmental outcomes; 
however, these policies generally encounter more barriers to adoption and are more challenging to 
implement because of opposition on the ground [6]. Our paper shows how national governments can 
overcome this opposition and facilitate cooperation through appropriate governance structures. 
2.1. Within-Country Implementation of EU Policies and Policy Mixes 
Overall, we can identify three main waves in the understanding of the implementation gap 
within EU public policy literature [57]. The progression between the first, second and third wave of 
EU implementation studies has been towards a greater understanding of the role of actors 
(policymakers and interest groups) in shaping policy outcomes. 
The first wave emphasised legal, administrative and constitutional factors and saw 
implementation as a rather apolitical process [58–60]. First-wave scholars were criticised for using 
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fixed institutional factors to explain changes at the policy-sector level [61] and tended not to 
differentiate between the legal transposition of the directive into national legislation and the policy 
outcome. In reaction to these criticisms, second wave scholars proposed explanations based on the 
idea of the degree of policy fit/misfit (or the goodness-of-fit hypothesis), which is based on the 
assumption that if an EU policy demands radical changes internally in terms of regulatory style or 
policy content, domestic actors will resist implementation [62,63]. In spite of being theoretically 
appealing, the empirical evidence in support of the goodness-of-fit hypothesis has been weak [64]. 
Finally, a third wave of EU implementation studies has been increasingly concerned with the role of 
actors and domestic politics in shaping policy outcomes [65–67]. This has opened up the space for 
more dynamic and context-specific explanations that take into consideration internal dynamics 
linked to interest-maximisation, persuasion and consensus, as well as the policy effects of exogenous 
events [68,69]. 
This paper departs from this literature to develop a novel and governance-specific focus on the 
interaction between institutions and actors to explore implementation outcomes. It identifies 
pathways linking governance arrangements to the adoption of effective policy mixes and a better 
delivery of IWRM [26,29]. In particular, following the third wave, we highlight the role of interest 
groups’ and policymakers’ behaviours in the implementation process. Unlike the third wave, 
however, we also acknowledge that the organisational configuration and governance structures 
affect and alter influence and behaviours, and they are therefore important factors to consider. This 
means that through governance structures, policymakers can facilitate cooperation and gain the 
support of interest groups that are initially reluctant to accept more ambitious regulatory 
interventions. 
Based on this, we conduct our analysis using two conceptual building blocks. First, we see 
institutions as non-neutral arenas that can constrain or enable policy actors who ultimately determine 
the quality of an implementation process [70,71]. Second, we assume that governance structures 
dynamically create windows of opportunity for policy actors to participate more or less effectively in 
the policy process [61]. For instance, the allocation of clear responsibilities empowers policy actors to 
have a stronger say in the decision-making while at the same time making them more accountable 
and therefore more likely to comply. Similarly, policies can be co-designed with key interest groups 
through intensive and meaningful engagement or, conversely, interest groups can be involved only 
in the consultation stage, which is often too late to bring about meaningful change and consensus. 
Through the identification of these windows of opportunity, and the observation of how policy actors 
react and adapt their strategies to them, it is possible to establish a pathway between governance and 
policy choices. 
We build a multi-layered analytical framework to analyse country-level implementation of the 
WFD, with the specific aim of linking different WFD governance arrangements to the adoption of 
more or less ambitious policies to tackle agricultural diffuse pollution. Here, we focus on three key 
innovative principles that characterize the WFD and that underpin the holistic approach to water 
management advocated. These principles are: public participation; water management at the river 
basin scale; and the need to consider the impact on water resources from all anthropic activities, 
especially (for the purposes of this paper) agricultural production. Subsequently, we ground these 
principles within the expectations derived and developed from the literature on EU policy 
implementation as outlined above. From this literature, we derive three dimensions that underpin 
the analytical framework used for the analysis of the empirical findings, namely cooperation, 
consistency and salience. The first dimension stems from the acknowledgement that when 
implementing legislation, policymakers face internal dynamics, such as interest-maximisation and 
conflicts between sectors, which in turn affects policy outcomes. In this regard, the expectation from 
the literature is that if policymakers are able to foster cooperation towards a common goal through 
careful institutional design, we should observe better quality policy outputs. The second dimension, 
consistency, indicates whether policymakers are able to design governance arrangements that are fit 
for purpose and that avoid fragmentation. This is a relevant dimension to consider in this analysis, 
given that the WFD required a stepwise change in water management from a piecemeal approach 
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towards a more holistic and integrated policy approach (see above). The expectation here is that 
dedicated governance structures with appropriately allocated responsibilities and competences 
between different policy actors can create conditions to overcome fragmentation, avoid negative 
interactions or the duplication of efforts and promote IWRM [41]. Finally, we argue that governance 
arrangements and decision-making are influenced by the broader political context and, in this, 
policymakers have a responsibility to protect the policy salience of the WFD vis-à-vis other societal 
challenges and political priorities, which we consider to be a key factor in the adoption of ambitious 
policy measures. 
The following sections discuss how the three dimensions in the analytical framework are 
operationalised for the analysis of the empirical cases in more detail. 
2.2. Cooperation 
The first dimension that we consider is the degree of cooperation between governments or 
responsible authorities and representatives from the agricultural sector, and the extent to which 
policymakers put in place mechanisms to enhance this cooperation. When policymakers have to 
implement a piece of legislation, they have to mediate the interests of various actors, each 
representing a specific institution or organisation within the policymaking environment [72]. As the 
third-wave EU implementation literature demonstrates, the influence of interest groups is key to 
explaining implementation outcomes [66,67]. In order to achieve positive outcomes, interactions 
between policymakers and interest groups should be based on cooperation and trust. The WFD 
acknowledges this and advocates the principle of public participation in order to allow all interests 
to be considered during policymaking [73,74]. We consider actors’ interests, in particular the extent 
to which they are represented in the process, and how policymakers successfully achieve a synthesis 
between contrasting priorities without compromising the adoption of effective policies [75]. In so 
doing, we do not assume that everyone has equal power throughout the process. Rather, in line with 
our view of institutions as non-neutral arenas, the way cooperation is structured empowers or 
disempowers certain policy actors. There is a wide academic research that problematises public 
participation processes which points to the fact that they often result in the exclusion of certain voices 
in favour of others [76–78]. Moreover, there is no agreement on what form of public participation is 
the most effective and even within EU countries the quality and the depth of public participation 
processes for the WFD vary substantially [44,79]. Therefore, national policymakers’ understanding 
and handling of interest groups’ power and the way in which their influence unfolds is key and can 
enable (or conversely undermine) positive cooperation towards achieving the WFD goals. For a 
positive outcome, we should expect policymakers to create the conditions for a fair and open public 
participation process aimed at developing policies for achieving good ecological and chemical status. 
2.3. Consistency 
The second aspect that we analyse is the consistency of governance arrangements with the WFD 
requirements. In order to promote an integrated approach that would tackle all sources of pollution 
affecting each water body regardless of administrative boundaries, the WFD required water 
management to follow the river basin scale, thus introducing the physical geography dimension into 
water policies [20]. Like in the case of public participation, the WFD does not prescribe what type of 
governance arrangements governments had to set up in the implementation phase. These could 
include formal or more informal structures to design and monitor the implementation of the river 
basin management plans, and could include the creation of new river basin district authorities, 
steering groups, or the allocation of competences on the basis of traditional administrative 
departments. In line with our view that governance arrangements constitute non-neutral arenas, we 
expect that effective WFD governance will overcome administrative and policy fragmentation and 
political opposition. Borrowing from the policy integration literature, mechanisms that could achieve 
this might include a policymaking setting that allows for the explicit integration of agricultural 
policies with water policies [80,81]. Crucially, this integration should be followed through with a 
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clear allocation of responsibilities and competences among key actors and an appropriate level of 
resourcing. 
2.4. Salience 
The final dimension that we analyse is the extent to which policymakers are able to keep the 
WFD implementation high on the political agenda. The level of ambition can be affected by external 
events, or critical junctures, as they change policymakers’ priorities with regards to problems and 
solutions [69,82]. A paradigm shift in water governance needs strong support and ambition by 
policymakers to move away from business-as-usual practices. However, because the implementation 
of WFD policies do not happen in isolation from the broader context, the attention and commitment 
that they receive is relative to other priorities and can change over time. Policy makers therefore have 
to maintain the salience of the WFD to ensure that throughout the implementation process, ambitious 
and effective policy-measures are adopted and enforced [23]. 
While the issue of political ambition could be explored from many different theoretical 
perspectives, for the purpose of this paper we look at how governance arrangements led actors to 
prioritise the likelihood that policies achieve the WFD environmental goal over other criteria (e.g., 
cost, or avoiding resistance on the ground), and how policymakers maintain a relative prioritisation 
of water quality over other contingent issues (e.g., policies of austerity following the 2008 financial 
crisis). Table 1 provides a summary of the dimensions that will be analysed and of the potential 
observations, while Figure 1 provides a conceptual visualization of the analytical framework. 
Table 1. A framework to analyse how governance arrangements influenced policy choices—specific 
to diffuse pollution from agriculture. 
Dimension Aspect to Analyse Potential Observation 
Cooperation Extent to which governance arrangements 
facilitate cooperation between policy actors 
• Cooperation between agricultural sector and 
decision makers and/or stated barriers  
• Governance arrangements granting more or 
less direct access to decision-making process 
Consistency 
Consistency of governance arrangements 
with the WFD requirements and with wider 
institutions in countries  
• Explicit integration and coordination of 
agricultural policies within implementation 
• Responsibilities and competences 
appropriately allocated and resourced 
Salience 
Ability of governance arrangements to 
maintain the WFD policy salience 
• Explicit consideration of likelihood to achieve 
environmental goal in decision-making 
• Relative prioritization of environmental goal 
compared to other societal challenges 
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Figure 1. Conceptual visualization of the analytical framework. 
3. Case Studies Selection and Methods 
For this study, we employ a most-different case-study design approach and selected two within-
country cases (England and Scotland) in the United Kingdom (UK) [83]. The added value of a case 
study research design is that it can provide in-depth consideration of the causal mechanisms that lead 
to an outcome [84]. In this case, it shows how the WFD implementation unfolds within different 
multilevel governance systems, characterised by different WFD-specific and country-specific internal 
governance arrangements. Crucially, it allows us to look at variation in performance, not as a country-
level variable, but as dependent on governance arrangements that can vary between devolved 
authorities or regionally, as well as between countries. For example, in the UK the devolved 
institutional framework allowed a comparison between England and Scotland, which used different 
approaches and delivered different results, thus providing within-country insights into the factors 
that drive different outcomes [85]. We use the analytical framework (above) to conduct a comparative 
analysis of the findings; the comparative analysis allows us to identify the factors that were more or 
less likely to be conducive to more effective policy choices to tackle diffuse pollution. We present our 
findings in two parts: first, we provide an overview of the empirical findings in the two case studies 
(summarized in Table 2); we then comparatively discuss the findings in light of the analytical and 
highlight the implication for policies tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture. 
Table 2. Overview of the WFD implementation in the case settings. 
Dimension England Scotland 
Policy preference • Soft measures • General binding rules 
Cooperation 
• Conflicts between sectors not well 
addressed 
• Traditional public consultation 
methods 
• Importance of engagement on the 
ground recognised but not 
adequately supported 
• Positive institutional relations linked 
to higher degree of acceptability 
• High degree of trust between 
interest groups 
• Extensive and intensive engagement 
Consistency 
• No dedicated governance 
structures  
• Inadequate resourcing 
• Lack of explicit link between 
activities and WFD goal 
• Shared access to decision making 
through National and Sub-National 
Advisory Groups) 
• Strong support to SEPA from the 
Scottish Government. 
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• Clear allocation of responsibilities 
and competencies 
Salience 
• Lack of leadership in driving 
implementation 
• Deregulatory agenda 
• Support for austerity policies after 
2008 global financial crisis 
• Focus on business profitability 
• Pioneering behaviour in 
environmental policies 
• Consistent political commitment 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The collection and analysis of the data for this article was part of a broader research project 
conducted between 2012 and 2017, which received full ethical approval. Semi-structured interviews 
with key informants in person or by phone were conducted between 2014 and 2016 at the EU level 
and in the case studies—a total of 25 interviews. The interview process focused on a specific time 
period in the history of the WFD, namely from 2000 to 2015, covering the adoption of the WFD until 
the end of the first implementation cycle, to explore the establishment of governance arrangements 
and structures. Participants were representative of a wide range of organisations to gather a variety 
of perspectives and, where possible, more than one person for each organisation was approached 
and interviewed to gather more insights into the implementation process (see Table A1 in Appendix 
A for a coded list of interviews). 
Documents were also used for triangulation purposes and extended to the second 
implementation cycle. The data from the interviews and the documents was organised following 
research-driven codes derived from the analytical approach and it was then analysed through 
qualitative content analysis [86] (see Appendix B for a list of key documents). We coded the empirical 
data against a coding framework directly derived from the analytical approach derived from the 
literature as set out in Table A2 (Appendix A); after the formulation of the main codes, each 
participant was assigned an ID to protect their anonymity and quotes were categorized based on the 
coding framework. Data was coded manually to allow deeper contextualization of each quote [87,88]. 
The analytical process was iterative, meaning that we refined our initial coding framework after 
initial analysis through abduction and retroduction, and connections were identified by themes and 
codes [89]. In this paper, we used process tracing to link and situate our findings within our analytical 
framework, thus ensuring the construct validity of our research [84]. Process tracing can be used as 
analytical tool to identify causal mechanisms and their interaction with the broader context [90,91]. 
Moreover, process tracing can be used to examine whether the causal mechanisms that a theory 
implies are observed in the case setting. 
4. Implementation of the WFD in the Case Settings 
When analyzing the WFD implementation with a focus on agricultural diffuse pollution in 
England and Scotland, it is important to highlight that the two cases present different baselines and 
geographical challenges. In 2018, the utilized agricultural area in England was 9 million hectares 
(approximately 69% of the total area of England) and the total area of arable crops in England stood 
at 3.9 million hectares [92]. The Scottish Government [93] reports that most of Scottish land is used 
for agriculture (6.2 million hectares, 77% of Scotland), most of which is designated as Less Favoured 
Area (LFA). Around 10% (574,000 hectares) of Scottish land is used for crops or fallow. The relative 
size of the countries and economies must also be considered. Arable land accounts for 30% of total 
landmass in England and 7% in Scotland but farming in Scotland contributes slightly more to Gross 
Value Added (0.7% compared to 0.5% in England) and provides a greater proportion of jobs (2.5% of 
employment in Scotland is in agriculture compared to 1.2% in England), creating different pressures 
and opportunities for governments aiming to work with farmers in both settings [94]. 
The WDF was transposed into UK national legislation through the Water Environment (Water 
Framework Directive) Regulations 2003 for England and Wales, and the Water Environment and 
Water Services Act 2003 in Scotland (WEWS). Water governance in the UK is devolved to 
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autonomous governments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, whereas in England the UK 
government is the responsible authority. At the strategic level, the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the UK government department responsible for water bodies, but 
the responsibility for the production and implementation of the river basin management plans is 
placed on the national Environment Agency (EA) in England and on the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland, both non-departmental public bodies and environmental 
regulators. The agricultural sector is represented by the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) in England, 
an association with over 300 branch offices and by its equivalent (NFUS) in Scotland. The UK set up 
15 river basin districts across the five administrative areas—England, Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Gibraltar. 
Existing studies on the implementation of the WFD in the UK focused particularly on the 
opportunities that the directive offered to innovate water governance and management through 
public participation [35]. These studies generally linked increased public participation stemming 
from the WFD implementation process to increased quality and increased acceptability of policy 
outputs [39–41], while other contributions highlighted that important role of third sector River Trusts 
charities in creating partnerships with the EA [95,96]. In general, studies conducted in England 
concluded that in spite of attempts to try different and more bottom-up approaches, participatory 
experiences have been highly variable [97] and, further, this potential had not been fully exploited 
[43,74,98,99]. In addition, since 2013, the UK Government has attempted a Catchment Based 
Approach (CaBA) to foster active stakeholder engagement and to strengthen existing and newly 
formed catchment partnerships [100]. However, the CaBA did not replaced public participation 
practices under the WFD and this policy disconnect still remains to be addressed [43]. Studies that 
focused specifically on Scotland, tackled the WFD implementation from an economic [101] and cost-
benefit analysis perspective [102], the latter concluding in favour of positive net social benefits 
resulting from the implementation of the WFD in Scotland as a whole). In analyzing the Scottish 
RBMPs, Waylen et al. [103] provide a detailed analysis of the working method of the advisory groups 
(which will be discussed more in detailed below) and concluded that the more localized approach 
taken in Scotland increased stakeholders’ ability to influence planning [79]. 
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is the need for more specific within-country 
comparative studies that causally link WFD governance arrangements to the adoption of effective 
measures to tackle diffuse pollution from agriculture. While public participation and stakeholder 
engagement is one factor that influence policymaking, such analysis should consider more 
holistically the effect on policymaking of the WFD governance arrangements as set out by national 
governments, as well as the influence of political factors on such choices. The comparative analysis 
of England and Scotland offered in this paper addresses this gap by identifying how country-specific 
factors contributed to creating the conditions for the adoption of different governance arrangements 
and how this influenced the development of more or less ambitious policy mixes in England and 
Scotland. 
4.1. England: Watering Down Regulation 
4.1.1. Compliance with the WFD 
England has seven river basin districts. Data on the ecological status of natural surface water 
bodies indicates that in the first cycle (2009–2015) England struggled to make substantial progress 
towards the environmental goal. Initially, Defra had estimated that 24% of surface water bodies 
would be in good water status during the period 2009–2014. However, more recently Defra has 
recorded that the number of surface water bodies in good or high ecological status has dropped by 
33% and in 2017 only 16% were classified in good or high status [104]. Moreover, the percentage of 
water bodies in poor ecological status increased between 2009 and 2017 from 12% to around 20%, 
resulting in England violating the ban on non-deterioration, a fundamental and binding principle of 
the directive. England is still far from achieving the WFD environmental goal and the second cycle 
of RBMPs showed little change of ambition, with an unambitious increase to just 25% expected by 
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2021. The EA is currently committed to achieving good water quality in 21% of the rivers, 19% of 
lakes, 53% of coastal waters and in 25% of estuaries by 2021 and it has been recently recognised that 
it will be unlikely that the WFD goal will be met even by the end of the third cycle [105]. 
4.1.2. Policy Approach 
In England the Environment Agency (EA) manages the RBMPs and is supported in the delivery 
phase by Natural England, the government’s advising body on the natural environment. The 
regulatory and advisory bodies are tasked with liaising with the National Farmers’ Unions in 
England with raising the awareness of individual farmers, and with delivering key programmes for 
the implementation of the WFD aimed specifically at the agricultural sector. 
Two main initiatives which are exemplificative of this approach are the Catchment Sensitive 
Farming (CSF) and the Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme. These were set up in 2006 to address 
diffuse pollution, as an experimental programme in 40 catchments (which corresponded to roughly 
40% of the country). The schemes are both run by Natural England, in partnership with the EA and 
Defra. Catchment Sensitive Farming aims to raise awareness of diffuse water pollution from 
agriculture by giving free training and advice to farmers in selected areas in England. The selected 
areas (priority catchments) were those ‘where improvements in water quality will make the greatest 
contribution to the Water Framework Directive objectives’ [106]. More recently, in 2018, the 
government launched a new competitive grant scheme, the Water Environment Grant, to fund 
projects aimed at improving the water environment in rural England. In order to be successful, the 
proposed projects must help achieve the objective of the RBMPs. These schemes constitute voluntary 
measures that do not provide for enforcement mechanisms and whose uptake is heavily dependent 
on the discretion of individuals. 
4.1.3. Cooperation 
Participatory approaches in England relied on existing consultation procedures and were 
neither extensive nor intensive enough to build a true partnership based on trust between the 
regulator, the farming sector and environmental NGOs. There was an attempt to create a UK-wide 
dedicated governance structure through the creation of a technical and expert group (UKTAG) 
chaired by the EA and composed of representatives of all environment and conservation agencies 
such as Natural England. However, this organisation is mainly dedicated to providing technical 
advice; and other interest groups, including agriculture or environmental NGOs are not part of it. 
The lack of true partnership was lamented by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), a 
national Environmental NGO, since the very early stages of the WFD implementation. The RSPB 
expressed concerns about the fact that Defra was not being proactive in putting in place a process to 
get farming, industrial and environmental NGOs partners to work together. They warned that, in 
this way, the EA was not going to ‘meet the environmental objectives of the WFD alone’ (2002). As 
pointed out to us, environmental NGOs felt that the consultation process had been framed and set to 
a very low standard in order to do the bare minimum and avoid infringement procedures (UK 
environmental NGO participant 1). UKTAG regularly launched consultations (the latest one closed 
in May 2019), thus demonstrating an understanding of the importance of engagement with interest 
groups but the traditional consultation methods did not go far enough to reduce oppositions and 
create consensus. 
4.1.4. Consistency 
The limited scope and powers of UKTAG meant that the achievement of the WFD goal had to 
rely on business as usual approaches rather than on a consistent commitment to develop integrated 
water management approaches. Policymakers in England wanted to avoid farmers’ opposition and, 
therefore, they avoided approaching them with a WFD-specific target: ‘You have to be very smart 
and use a language that will interest farmers. You do not talk about targets, WFD, rules, regulations’, 
as one interviewee from Natural England put it. This led to the adoption of soft measures and 
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voluntary schemes based on incentives such as the CSF and the CS described above, which 
accommodated farmers’ opposition to binding regulation and one-size-fits-all solutions. Interview 
data shows that the government perceived resistance from the agricultural sector on the ground to 
the introduction of potentially new and more ambitious measures. However, their strategy of 
accommodation fuelled a sense of frustration among those farmers who were more willing to comply, 
including among more progressive and proactive farmers who felt unfairly treated and unrewarded 
by the government. 
To ensure a good uptake of CSF and CS, Natural England carried out engagement activities with 
individual farmers and tried to reach more remote farms, where late adopters are more likely to live 
and work and where these initiatives would have a stronger impact. In the opinion of staff from 
Natural England in delivering CSF or CS schemes on the ground, overcoming resistance and building 
trust in those areas takes at least three years and requires a committed government strategy. 
However, Natural England staff did not have adequate resources to engage with individual farmers 
and organise one-to-one visits particularly in more remote areas (Natural England Participant 1). 
Natural England’s resourcing and budget has been curtailed by more than half since 2008 and staff 
numbers have also been reduced from more than 2500 in 2016 to an estimated 1500 in 2019 [107]. The 
uncertainty created by continuous budget cuts undermined Natural England’s attempt to maintain 
consistency in their work with the agricultural sector. As a result, Natural England were neither able 
to effectively raise awareness or develop a sense of shared responsibility and trust with the 
agricultural sector, and even the uptake of voluntary measures was undermined. 
4.1.5. Salience 
The slow progress in England has been the result of low ambition throughout the 
implementation process and this can be linked to two factors. First, the rationale for setting up the 
national water quality targets was disconnected from the WFD goal. Richard Benyon, MP, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at Defra, declared that the UK’s ambition to reach 35% of 
water bodies in good status was not a target to work towards to, but an estimation of the likely 
outcome with the measures that were already in place [108]. In other words, policy choices were not 
determined on the basis of what was best to achieve the WFD goal and instead were modelled on a 
business-as-usual approach. In England, the government was not committed to achieving the WFD 
stated targets. Participants described the WFD environmental goal as ‘aspirational’ and suggested 
that the achievement of moderate status was even more desirable than good status: ‘In reality, the 
moderate status for certain things allow you to balance what society wants and the environmental 
demand’ (senior participant from the Environment Agency). The description of the environmental 
goal as aspirational, and therefore negotiable, was used to water down measures to tackle diffuse 
pollution and avoid binding regulation that would have delivered better results. 
Second, the adoption of soft measures was also coherent with the broader deregulatory agenda 
pursued by the UK government since 2010 [109,110]. Deregulation was in some cases perceived by 
participants as a sign of gradual political disengagement and unwillingness to commit the required 
resources, rather than a way to achieve environmental goals more efficiently, as advocated by 
deregulation proponents. Figure 2 illustrates this process. 
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Figure 2. Overview of key actors and governance arrangements in England. 
Looking ahead to 2021, the second RBMPs for England show some progress in terms of holistic 
thinking based on natural capital principles and tools that should encourage a system approach. In 
an attempt to provide stricter guidance, in April 2018 the UK government adopted new farming rules 
for water which apply to all farmers in England (Reduction and Prevention of Agricultural Diffuse 
Pollution (England) Regulations 2018). 
The new rules are described by Defra as ‘win-win’ measures for farmers and the environment 
as they are aimed at more efficient use of fertilisers. The rules require farmers to adopt good practice 
in managing their land to avoid water pollution including from fertilisers and manures. Farmers will 
have a checklist that will help them to adopt these rules, and ahead of using enforcement measures 
the EA will seek more cooperative implementation strategies. In setting out these rules Defra focuses 
explicitly on business benefits for farmers which they think will help to drive compliance. The EA is 
in charge of verifying compliance through targeted farm inspections and will focus particularly on 
those catchments where the pressure from agriculture is higher [111]. 
Enforcement measures include potential follow-up visits and in cases of pollution or high risk 
of pollution, the EA may prosecute farmers who do not comply. Thus, England seems to be moving 
to a more integrated approach, but this will not be fully embedded until at least 2021. The new rules 
are part of the Government plan to deliver a Green Brexit, which highlights famers’ role in ensuring 
food production and promises business benefits for the sector. Alongside the new rules against 
pollution, a new Agricultural Bill is currently under discussion (at the time of writing it is in its second 
reading) which should grant farmers post-Brexit subsidies and incentives for protecting “public 
goods” including clean water. It is worth stressing, however, that in order for these policies to be 
successful, the EA alongside Natural England will need to be backed up with appropriate resourcing 
and capacity to carry out, monitor and evaluate their delivery. 
4.2. Scotland: Joint Decision-Making 
4.2.1. Compliance with the WFD 
Scotland has two river basin districts (RBDs), one that falls entirely within the Scottish territory 
(Scotland RBD) and one which is shared with England (Solway Tweed). In the first cycle (2009–2015) 
the two Scottish RBDs expected an increase of 6.5 percentage points (pp) and 4.4pp (against an UK 
average of 2.5pp) in the number of water bodies with good global (ecological and chemical) status 
from 63.5% and 32.5% respectively. The better performance of the Scotland RBD has continued 
throughout the second cycle and now SEPA expects a further increase of 6 percentage points (pp) 
and 16 pp by 2021 and 2027 respectively [112]. Differences in the baseline, physical geography and 
agricultural pressure must be acknowledged when comparing Scotland to England. Nonetheless, for 
the purposes of this paper it is relevant that all the participants that were part of the WFD 
implementation in Scotland expressed enthusiasm towards the working method adopted by Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency, which is elaborated on below. 
Water 2020, 12, 244 13 of 24 
 
4.2.2. Policy Approach 
In terms of governance, the WFD falls under the Scottish Government’s devolved powers, which 
enabled a substantially different approach than England to tackling water pollution from agriculture. 
The Scottish approach stems from the view that a single integrated piece of regulation to implement 
the WFD would have delivered better results while at the same time minimizing the administrative 
and regulatory burden for business and productive activities. This is in line with the integrated water 
management principles as advocated by the WFD. 
Until the WFD came into force, water regulation in Scotland was limited to restrictions over 
abstractions and control of point source discharges, but lacked a comprehensive regulation and 
control over all other activities [113]. After the adoption of the 2003 Water Environment and Water 
Services Act, the Scottish Government and SEPA laid out comprehensive Controlled Activities 
Regulations based on three tiers of controls which tackled different scales of activities [113,114]. The 
three tiers are: general binding rules to cover small risks to the water environment; registrations to 
control activities for which the environmental impact is predictable and likely to have cumulative 
impacts; and licenses to control greater risks to the water environment. This integrated regulatory 
framework ensures that all activities that can cause an adverse effect on water are considered and 
regulated. 
4.2.3. Cooperation 
The Scottish approach to WFD was highly cooperative. Extensive engagement with interest 
groups in public participation processes started quite early on (from 2001) and were retained in an 
iterative nature throughout the implementation process. In addition to traditional formal 
consultation methods, SEPA also organised intensive meetings and workshops, over a period of two 
years, where representatives of each policy sector were at the same table discussing new regulations 
and licenses, and were thus able to directly shape decisions and modify SEPA’s proposals (Scottish 
Government 2005). These discussions created support for the adoption of the regulatory framework 
and reduced conflicts over binding measures through the development of trust between interest 
groups. Strong relationships were maintained through the formation of National Advisory Groups 
by SEPA which continuously engaged all key interest groups and provided a mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts arising throughout the implementation process. 
Moreover, in collaboration with professional organisations and farmers unions, the Scottish 
government and SEPA worked with individual farmers to gain their trust and drive acceptability. 
This continuous and consistent interaction meant that the relationship between SEPA and the 
National Farmers Union Scotland was ‘positively transformed’ (UK SEPA participant 1). These 
government stakeholder relations were facilitated by coordination between Scottish Government and 
SEPA: ‘We have a more joined up approach [compared to England] and interest groups are getting 
the same message, they see consistency—which is an important element of the Scottish approach (UK 
Scottish government participant 2)’. Consistency was weaker in England, where some English 
farmers’ feared that the initiatives of Natural England would be discontinued. 
Stakeholder cooperation was further enhanced during the second cycle of RBMPs (2015–2021). 
For this stage, SEPA developed interactive maps and tools to make data on pressures and water 
quality more accessible and shareable, which interest groups and stakeholders found extremely 
useful [115]. Consultations for the second cycle showed that participants were supportive of a high 
level of ambition and that ‘a slower progress would lose important momentum and partners may 
become disengaged’ [116] (p. 9). Looking ahead, consultations have started for the third cycle and 
participants have confirmed support towards a partnership approach and an even more integrated 
approach, recognising the benefits of fully embedding RBMPs in land use planning and other plans 
and strategies, such as forestry strategies and biodiversity strategies [115]. 
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4.2.4. Consistency 
Responsibility for enforcing the WFD was clearly established with the Scottish government 
giving SEPA the authority to consistently implement substantial measures and the power to commit 
adequate resources to the achievement of the WFD targets: ‘There wasn’t any baggage. People 
wanted to make use of the opportunity. We had momentum. We were trying to deal with the whole 
picture from the start’ (UK SEPA participant 3). Furthermore, the regulation guidance openly refers 
to the WFD, in contrast with what happened in England, where links with the WFD objectives tended 
to be downplayed. 
In addition to enforcement, consistency was provided by the responsibilities and competencies 
of other actors clearly being drawn out. This was done through establishing a Diffuse Pollution 
Management Advisory Group (DPMAG). The DPMAG is composed of a wide range of interest 
groups, including the National Farmer’s Union of Scotland, Scottish Water, SEPA, Scottish 
Government, Scotland National Heritage. DPMAG developed a strategy to reduce diffuse pollution 
based on a national campaign, a national engagement programme and a targeted approach focused 
on 14 priority catchments and focus areas [117]. Within DPMAG, the allocation of responsibilities is 
clear: for instance, while SEPA and the Scotland’s Rural College (SRUC) are in charge of carrying out 
the national campaign, NFUS and Scottish Land & Estates (SLE) support them on how to best engage 
with the agricultural sector, while Scottish Natural Heritage carries out inspections where 
appropriate. The plan underscores the importance of partnership and recognises that while the 
responsibilities are assigned on an individual basis, the achievement of the RBPMs is ‘a shared goal 
for Scottish Government, SEPA, Scottish Natural Heritage, Scottish Water, Forestry Commission 
Scotland, responsible authorities and sector responsibilities’. This approach explicitly assigned 
responsibility, and therefore accountability, to all actors in each sector. As observed by a participant 
from Scottish Water, they could not ignore this commitment, ‘we had to participate’. 
Moreover, a degree of consistency in the implementation of the WFD was promoted through a 
consistent approach to resolving conflicts between interest groups, including those regarding cost 
and technical feasibility issues. The Scottish Government and SEPA understood that to facilitate 
implementation and make sure that farmers were on board, clarity and consistency would act as a 
proxy for their own political commitment. During the joint group sessions, SEPA extensively used 
data and evidence to establish a common understanding of the status of the environment and on the 
level of commitment required to reduce water pollution, which helped them to overcome cognitive 
conflicts and different perceptions. Scientific and photographic evidence of breaches and polluting 
practices was brought up during meetings to convince the farming sector that diffuse pollution from 
agriculture was the main polluting source. The specificity and the relevance of the evidence used was 
a crucial factor to get all the sectors on board (SEPA participant). In the view of a participant from an 
English NGO, the Scottish government’s commitment was crucial to convincing farmers that 
accepting binding regulation was necessary to protect the future sustainability of their land. 
4.2.5. Salience 
In many ways, Scotland sees itself as a pioneer in environmental policy [118]. This ambition was 
reflected in the integrated approach taken in Scotland vis-à-vis the WFD, including the facilitation of 
a more cooperative and consistent implementation strategy, and the greater saliency of the directive 
compared to in England. The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Scottish 
Government were clear from the outset that they would adopt a strict regulatory approach. SEPA 
engages with farmers and land managers to raise awareness and to conduct an audit on the ground. 
Based on the results of the individual audits, SEPA requires farmers and land manager to adopt 
measures to reduce polluting activities (e.g., maintaining field drains, licensing, tackling point source 
discharges, etc.). In some cases, land managers would receive further support for example through 
nutrient budgeting. Any cases of non-compliance identified during an initial visit would be 
addressed through subsequent revisits, followed by fixed monetary penalties (FMP) if non-
compliance persisted. At the end of the first cycle, SEPA reported that they visited all 14 priority 
catchments and conducted 3215 initial visits to farms. The initial visits revealed a compliance rate of 
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34%. After 1667 revisits, 85% of the farms showed a positive response and at the end of another round 
of revisits, 98% of farmers carried out the required actions [119]. The work for the second cycle started 
in July 2016 with on the ground visits starting in November 2016. Figure 3 provides an overview of 
this process. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of key actors and governance arrangements in Scotland. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions: Managing Barriers and Creating Enablers 
This paper has demonstrated how different governance arrangements that England and 
Scotland have put in place to implement the WFD have brought about different approaches to 
tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture. In both cases a range of factors meant farmers were critical 
to the successful implementation of the WFD. However, governance arrangements established 
different forms of engagement, with different levels of success. Differences in the physical geography 
settings (arable farming is a more prevalent use of land in England) and the consequent importance 
of the agricultural sector presented additional challenges. This required a more decisive and 
cooperative approach from Defra and the EA in England to build consensus and fully engage with 
stakeholders [43]. The farming sector is hugely significant for Scotland: more than 70% of land is used 
for agriculture and much of this land is designated as LFA. The sector contributes more to Scotland’s 
Gross Value Added (GVA) than in England meaning the farming community are an important 
stakeholder base for the Scottish government. Through the comparison between the English and 
Scottish governance arrangements, this paper contributes to understanding the conditions under 
which the latter were more conducive to the adoption of stricter, more ambitious and more effective 
interventions. Our empirical findings contribute to the debate on the WFD governance issues with 
specific regards to tackling diffuse pollution, as set out in the editorial of this Special Issue. In 
particular, it tackles specifically the three key challenges that have been identified, namely the 
fragmentation and the distribution of responsibilities and competencies, while also touching on the 
issue of the contested use of knowledge-for-policy. We tackled the second challenge only indirectly, 
by showing that consistent governance, cooperation and policy salience can promote the use of 
evidence as a driver for action, and by outlining the mechanisms through which contested claims are 
resolved through transparent and open discussion, such as in the case of the Scottish advisory groups. 
With regards to the first challenge, our findings point to the beneficial role that dedicated 
organizational structure can play in delivering effective policy mixes. 
Building on a combined reading of the literatures on EU policy implementation and on the WFD 
specifically, we identified three dimensions—cooperation, consistency and salience—of WFD 
national-level governance with important implications for outcomes on the ground. National 
governments can design effective governance structures that enable all interest groups to have a say 
and to meaningfully take part in decision-making. Such structures require a clear allocation of 
responsibilities and direct engagement with interest groups. If such arrangements are in place, 
farmers are more likely to cooperate as they expect stricter regulation from the government and 
enforcement measures are perceived as inevitable. In this case, interest groups are more willing to be 
a constructive part of the decision-making process and to compromise in favour of long-term benefits 
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and sustainability, especially if they see the decision-making process as a genuine opportunity to 
influence policy outputs. While different and innovative governance arrangements such as the CaBA 
have been tried in the UK, so far there is mixed or limited evidence that they have contributed to 
reducing diffuse pollution [43]. Published research findings in this regards are also in line with our 
own interview findings, as participants did not mention CaBA when discussing WFD 
implementation and diffuse pollution from agriculture. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity in the 
UK to address the policy disconnect that exists between the CaBA and the WFD, thus giving the 
catchment-based groups more power to influence future RBMPs and to implement a more bottom-
up approach to water governance [38,99,100]. This is in line with recent studies that have identified 
pathways to improve participation in water governance. Yet, our contribution showed that in order 
to be successful, participation should happen within the context of governance that enables 
cooperation, balanced access to decision making and consistency. In this context, we stressed the 
pivotal role that central national governments play in creating the right conditions. The adoption of 
stricter regulatory measures also reflects the ambition of governments as well as their ability to build 
consensus and overcome barriers and opposition. The comparative analysis of England and Scotland 
focusing on cooperation, consistency and salience illuminates this. 
The way England went about setting its targets under the WFD was flawed from the outset. The 
government prioritised farmers’ interests, and thus avoided the adoption of strict regulatory 
measures for the entire first cycle, with predictably disappointing results. The lack of ambition in 
delivering the WFD undermined regulators’ chances of engaging farmers in developing consistent 
policies to reduce pollution and to build a relationship based on trust [43]. 
Furthermore, more recently, Defra and the EA have introduced new regulation with more 
binding requirements that should be in place by the 2021, in time for the third cycle of RBMPs. Despite 
this shift in favour of stricter regulation to reduce diffuse pollution from agriculture, the focus and 
the discourse in England remains centred on business interests and ‘win-win’ and, more recently, the 
government has also highlighted farmers’ central role in delivering a Green Brexit. However, there is 
no evidence that this shift will bring about more alignment between the RBMPs and agricultural 
policies, given that this shift has not happened on the back of a consistent effort to increase the 
acceptability of regulatory measures among individual farmers. Therefore, in our view it is unlikely 
that these changes will result in the achievement of the WFD environmental goal by 2021 and possibly 
even by 2027 [105]—that is if the WFD remains relevant in a post-Brexit England. 
By contrast, the Scottish Government consistently engaged with interest groups and 
stakeholders, and distributed responsibilities and accountabilities in a way that enabled trust and 
cooperation, as well as demonstrating commitment and maintaining the salience of the issue. Adding 
to the findings by Waylen et al. [11,103], we found that, in Scotland, more localized and purposive 
governance arrangements that were consistent with the requirements of the WFD, enabled 
cooperation between policy actors as a result of a more balanced access to power and more clearly 
allocated responsibilities and competences. The proactive intervention of the government and 
regulators in ensuring a fair and meaningful access to the decision-making process was critical in 
shaping the resulting policy mix. This level of engagement and the shared responsibilities created a 
sense of ‘ownership’ of the WFD implementation. This sense of ownership fostered solidarity and 
consensus among policymakers and interest groups that determined a ‘race to the top’ [118]. The 
focus of the Scottish approach to date remains on fostering partnership and cooperation and 
overcoming issues that are still of concern, such as the management of anaerobic digestate, and new 
issues that have been identified, such as plastic pollution in rivers. While progress in Scotland has 
been promising so far, it is important to note that the country faces challenges in the second and third 
cycle, particularly with regards to dealing with hydro-morphological pressures, as well as an 
increasingly volatile political context. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the empirical findings in light of the analytical approach. In 
applying the analytical approach to the case studies, we have considered institutions and governance 
structures as potential barriers or enablers to effective policy mixes, rather than explanatory factors 
itself [61]. In so doing, this paper has reconciled studies that emphasise the role of institutions in 
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driving successful implementation and studies that, instead, focus much more on the role of 
individual actors. Here, instead, we have broken down the statement that institutions and 
governance structures matter to identify the mechanisms through which governance choices 
influence the policy process and influence actors and the effectiveness of their strategies and 
priorities. 
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Appendix A. List of Interviews and Coding Framework  
Table A1. List of Interviews. 
Level/Country Organisation and Reference in the Paper 
EU (Brussels) 
EU Farming participant 
EU environmental NGO participant 
EU utility participant 
EC participant 1 & 2 (DG Environment and DG Agri) 
England 
Natural England participant 1, 2 & 3 
UK Utility participant 1 & 2 
UK Farming participant 
UK Consumer association participant 
Environment Agency (EA) participant 1 & 2 
UK environmental NGO participant 1, 2 & 3 
Scotland 
Scotland Farming participant 
Scotland utility participant 1 & 2 
Scottish Government participant 1 & 2 
SEPA participant 1, 2 & 3 
Table A2. Coding framework. 
Participant ID Cooperation Consistency Salience 
 
Perceived 
Barriers/Enablers 
to cooperation 
between 
agricultural 
sector and 
decision-makers 
Stated role of 
governance 
arrangements 
to grant more 
or less direct 
access to 
decision-
making 
Views on 
degree of 
integration 
between 
agricultural 
policies and 
measures in 
RBPMs 
Views on 
competences 
and resourcing 
Views on 
prioritisation 
of 
effectiveness 
as a criterion 
for choosing 
policies to 
tackle diffuse 
pollution in 
RBMPs 
Views on 
importance of 
WFD 
environmental 
goal vis-a-vis 
other political, 
social, 
environmental 
demands 
Codes/Quotes       
Appendix B. Key Documents 
• Commission Report (COM(2009) 156 (final): “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council in accordance with Article 18.3 of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC on 
programmes for monitoring of water status” [accessed from 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2c2027b9-2402-437c-a5cc-
cb6ec28ed637/language-en] 
• Commission Report (COM(2009) 156 (final): “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council in accordance with Article 18.3 of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC on 
programmes for monitoring of water status” 
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• Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive—River Basin Management Plans (COM (2012)670 of 14/11/2012) 
• Commission Staff Working Document—Member State Italy—Accompanying the document Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive 2000/60/CE River Basin Management Plans COM(2012)670 final 
• Commission Staff Working Document—Member State United Kingdom—Accompanying the document 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive 2000/60/CE River Basin Management Plans COM(2012)670 final 
• Commission Staff Working Document (SEC (2009) 415)—Appendix 2 [accessed from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/water/implrep2007/pdf/sec_2009_415_en.pdf] 
• Common Implementation Strategy guidance documents availa5ble at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/objectives/implementation_en.htm 
• Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—Towards 
sustainable water management in the European Union—First stage in the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive 2000/60/EC—[SEC(2007) 362] [SEC(2007) 363] /* COM/2007/0128 final */ 
• Copa-Cogeca: Implementing good practice within the Sustainable use Directive for Plant Protection 
Products: the farmer’s perspective Retrieved from: www.copa-cogeca.be/Download.ashx?ID=861344 [last 
access 2 March 2017] 
• Copa-Cogeca: The Future of the Common Agricultural Policy post-2013. Retrieved from: www.copa-
cogeca.be/Download.ashx?ID=1336705 
• DG ENVE, 1st Stakeholder workshop 10 May 2011—Draft findings part 1 & 2; Introduction DG ENVE 
https://circabc.europa.eu/ 
• EEB: Water What is the EEB doing? Retrieved from: 
http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/activities/biodiversity-nature/water/water-what-is-the-eeb-doing/ 
• Eureau—Water governance across Europe in light of the review of EU water framework directive. 
Retrieved from http://ebcd.org/event/water-governance-across-europe-light-review-eu-water-framework-
directive/ 
• Eureau—Water matters, the views of Europe’s water sector—Retrieved from http://www.eureau.org 
• European Commission Communication (2015) “The Water Framework Directive and the Floods 
Directive: Actions towards the good status of EU water and to reduce flood risks. Retrieved from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0120] 
• European Commission, DG Environment, Brussels, D (2011), Roadmap—Fitness Check—Freshwater 
Policy. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/blueprint/fitness_en.htm 264 
• Blueprint for water response to diffuse pollution consultation. Retrieved from: 
http://blueprintforwater.org.uk/publications/ 
• Blueprint for water- response to water resources planning guideline. Retrieved from: 
http://blueprintforwater.org.uk/publications/ 
• Blueprint for Water- Water Matters. Retrieved from: http://www.wcl.org.uk/docs/Blueprint-for-
Water_Water-Matters.pdf 
• Blueprint for water: water matters parliamentary briefing. Retrieved from: 
http://blueprintforwater.org.uk/publications/ 
• Blueprint for water. Response to the river basin management consultation. Retrieved from: 
http://blueprintforwater.org.uk/publications/ 
• CCwater—Information on the Water Framework Directive (2010). Retrieved from: 
https://www.ccwater.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Information-note-on-WFD-summer-2010.pdf 
• NFU—The water Framework Directive and the Catchment Based Approach. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nfuonline.com/assets/26048 
• NFUS (2008)—Proportionate approach to water management issues required. Retrieved from 
https://www.nfus.org.uk/news/news/proportionate-approach-water-management-issues-required 
• Scottish Water—Delivery plan 2010-2015. Retrieved from: 
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/assets/about%20us/files/delivery%20plan/swdp2015to21.pdf 
• SEPA—Diffuse Pollution Management Advisory Group—Meetings 
http://www.sepa.org.uk/environment/water/river-basin-management-planning/who-is-involved-with-
rbmp/dpmag/#Meetings 
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• SEPA—Action to improve Water Quality http://www.sepa.org.uk/environment/water/river-basin-
management-planning/actions-to-deliver-rbmp/#diffuse 
• SEPA—Compliance with regulations. Retrieved from: http://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/water/#one 
• SEPA—Diffuse Pollution Management Advisory Group: Strategy to Reduce Diffuse Pollution. Retrieved 
from: https://www.sepa.org.uk/environment/water/river-basin-management-planning/who-is-involved-
with-rbmp/dpmag/#Strategy 
• SEPA—How does SEPA implement the regulations? Retrieved from: 
http://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/water/#one 
• SEPA—State of Scotland’s Environment 2015—Water. Retrieved from: 
https://www.sepa.org.uk/media/286883/state-of-scotland-s-water-environment-2015-summary-report.pdf 
• SEPA—Water Environment Hub http://www.sepa.org.uk/data-visualisation/water-environment-hub/ 
• SEPA—What water regulations apply in Scotland? Retrieved from: 
http://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/water/#one 
• SEPA Implementing the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003. Retrieved from: 
http://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/water/ 
• SEPA The Scotland River Basin District (Standards) Directions 2014 Retrieved from: 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2014/08/6532 
• SEPA The Scotland River Basin District (Standards) Directions 2015. Retrieved from: 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/09/5076 
• UK River basin management plans and supporting documents (2009) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/river-basin-management-plans-2009 
• European Overview—Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the report: SWD (2012)379 
Volume 1 and SWD (2012)379 Volume 2 
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